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Abstract We analyse the results of British general elections from 1950 to 2015. In our
model, voting is both instrumental and expressive, and is driven both by ideology and the
perceived valence of different parties. On most assumptions the model predicts that the
safer the seat the lower the swing. The exception is where ideological factors are relatively
dominant in instrumental voting, and valence factors are relatively dominant in expressive
voting. In this case the highest swings might be in the safest seats. Alternatively swing
might peak at intermediate majorities, and this is what we find when we look at swings
between Conservative and Labour in seats held by one or other of these parties. We also
find that marginals behave more distinctively when the national result is expected to be
close or when there has been another general election recently; and that at least some
voters have a sense of what is a ‘bellwether’ seat i.e. one that would be marginal in a close
election. However in those seats where the main contest has been between the Conser-
vatives and Liberal Democrats, the swing is positively related to the closeness of the
contest.
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1 Introduction
Over the last 60 years there has been a trend—although not a steady or uninterrupted
one—for constituencies in British general elections to show less uniform swings. How far
these are a matter of ‘noise’ and how far underpinned by shifting regional and
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socioeconomic electoral patterns has been investigated intensively. In this article we are
going to look specifically at differences in the behavior of marginal, fairly safe and very
safe seats. The two uncontested propositions about marginal seats in Britain are that there
are fewer than there were (at least if you count them in terms of the two-party share of the
vote) and that turnout is higher in marginal seats than in safe ones. But does living in a
marginal constituency affect the way people vote as opposed to the likelihood that they
vote at all? Different types of seat might exhibit different degrees of absolute volatility, or
stronger and weaker adherence to the overall national trend in a general election, or a
different propensity to swing away from and back to the government of the day. In this
article we assemble the evidence from every general election between 1950 and 2015 to try
to answer these questions. We also ask whether being marginal or becoming marginal is
more likely to produce distinctive voter behaviour, and whether it is right to focus in the
first place on seats with current small majorities, as opposed to those which would be close
in the event of a close national result—the so-called bellwether seats.
In what follows, we use the terms marginal and safe in a comparative sense. One seat is
more marginal (less safe) than another if the winner’s percentage margin (as a share of all
votes cast) is smaller. By a swing between two parties we refer to the mean of the first-
place party’s percentage gain (again as a share of the total vote for all parties) and the
second-place party’s loss. For much of the time we will be looking at ‘swings to gainer’—
constituency swings in favour of the party that is gaining ground nationally. Any seat that
moves against the national trend therefore has a negative swing to gainer.
2 Literature
If people vote only when expected benefit (utility from deciding the government times the
probability that your vote will do so) exceeds the cost of voting, no rational person will
vote. It is always open to political scientists to attribute bad statistical sense to voters, so
that they exaggerate their chances of personally ejecting or saving their MP, or even the
government itself. But ‘minimum rational choice’ and ‘general incentives’ have been the
more popular options over the years. According to ‘minimum rational choice theory’
(Riker and Ordeshook 1973) voters also define their political efficacy ‘in terms of the
influence of groups of people like themselves. Consequently, they are motivated to take
action because they feel they can collectively make a difference’ (Clarke et al. 2004,
p. 248). If these groups include your political allies within your own constituency, and
collective efficacy is related to the likelihood that collective action will be pivotal, we have
a rationale for higher voter turnout rates in marginal seats. The general incentives model
(Whiteley et al. 1994; Whiteley and Seyd 2002) encompasses the minimum rational choice
approach but adds other motives for voting, in particular the expressive motive first put
forward by Buchanan (1954). And, in doing so, it provides not just a reason for higher
turnout in marginals but a rationale for a different pattern of voting. If voters have a
mixture of instrumental and expressive motives, the relative power of the latter will decline
as the efficacy of the vote increases (Tullock 1971). Consequently, voters who would like
to express a protest against the government, but still prefer it to the main opposition party,
might give it a grudging vote in a marginal seat which they would withhold in a safe one.
This, then, is our first reason to expect marginal and safe seats to have different patterns
of swing. Price and Sanders (1998) extend the analysis by attributing two alternative
objectives to disenchanted government supporters
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(a) punish the government as long as its majority is not reduced
(b) punish the government as long as it doesn’t lose office
Either of these factors would reduce anti-government swings in marginal seats. But in
that case they must reduce any pro-government swings in marginal seats, too. When the
trend is towards the government (i.e., increases its majority), some voters in safe seats,
previously protesting against the government, will return to it. So will some in the mar-
ginals, but not so many, because fewer deserted it in the first place. Whatever the direction
of the national swing, then, its beneficiary will gain fewer votes in marginal seats than in
safe ones.
Secondly, a generally positive personal vote for incumbent MPs will give parties par-
ticularly favorable swings in their own marginal seats taken as a whole. Unless a party
captured no seats at all from its opponents at the previous election, its marginals will
include a disproportionate number of candidates standing as the incumbent MP for the first
time, and thus enjoying an ‘incumbency swing’ less prevalent in safe seats. Several of the
election studies by Steed and/or Curtice (see below) notice an incumbent government
holding rather successfully onto its marginals when it is losing ground in general. A
particularly strong and persistent effect in their studies is how well a party generally does
when its incumbent MP fights a seat he or she gained from an incumbent opponent at the
previous election. This ‘double incumbency’ effect seems to have been particularly striking
in the elections of 2005, 1992, 1987 and 1970. (Steed 1970, p. 205; Curtice and Steed
1988, pp. 333–334, 1992, p. 340; Curtice et al. 2005, p. 248). In the 1970 case, Steed finds
that the double incumbency effect fully explains why the outgoing Labour government
suffered a less hostile swing in its 100 most marginal seats than across the country as a
whole. (In 1979, by contrast, when a Labour government was again defeated, but did less
badly in its own marginals, Curtice and Steed 1980 found the double incumbency effect to
explain only part of the phenomenon.)
The third reason why marginals are different is that parties campaign harder and spend
more in marginal seats. Again the most obvious—and well-documented—effect is on
turnout. Turnout in marginal constituencies has exceeded average national turnout in every
British election since 1950, but the size of this margin has fluctuated substantially. Denver
et al. (2003) trace the widening of the gap up to 1979, and its subsequent narrowing during
the Thatcher/Major years, only for it to open up again in 1997 and 2001. Controlling for
socioeconomic status (a significant determinant of turnout) alters the story insofar as the
downturn after 1979 is now backdated to 1966. The question raised is whether higher
turnout in marginals comes from the more intensive campaigning they undoubtedly attract
or whether the expected closeness of the result would have called out more voters anyway.
Denver, Hands and McAllister conclude that both of these factors matter, though their
relative strength appears to vary significantly between one election and another.
In addition, Curtice and Steed (1980) have found that the turnout effect of being a
marginal seat rises in elections that follow hard on their predecessors (1951, 1966, October
1974) and then drops back at the subsequent election (1955, 1970, 1979). Presumably this
is because recent memories of the previous election include a memory of the con-
stituency’s marginal status. If so, this is itself evidence that higher turnout in marginals is
not explained solely by more spending and harder campaigning there. So, indirectly, is the
finding by Clarke et al. (2004) that turnout is higher across the country when the national
result is close, given the lack of any inverse correlation between national winners’ margins
and combined campaign spending.
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To assert that more people would vote in marginal constituencies even if no party spent
a penny on them is not, of course, to say that campaigning is ineffective. Indeed, recent
evidence suggests not only that it is more effective than was previously thought, but that
the two main parties, even if they spend equal sums of money nationally, do not just
neutralize one another’s efforts. Some of this is because parties tend to spend more in their
own constituencies (Clarke et al. 2004). All of this means that we would expect to see each
party performing better in the marginals that it holds than in those it is trying to win over,
and Clarke et al. (2004) find exactly this in the 2001 election. In the 2015 election, the
difference was particularly striking. Across the 50 most marginal seats, the Conservative-
held ones swung by an average of 1.2% towards the Conservatives and the Labour ones by
2.5% towards Labour.
What the above facts imply is that good reasons exist to think that non-uniformity of
constituency swings is likely to be systematic as well as random, and a simple relation
whereby marginal seats feature smaller or larger swings than safe ones is unlikely. And
certainly the successive analyses of election swings by Michael Steed and John Curtice do
not add up to any such pattern. Aggregating their surveys, however, is not easy. The
definition of a marginal changes between surveys; in 1987, for example, they looked only
at government marginals; in elections that follow boundary changes they do not try to
identify marginals at all. This is not a criticism. Different approaches are appropriate to
different electoral situations. But it does mean that an aggregative study of very safe,
moderately safe, marginal and bellwether seats reaching down from 1950 has yet to be
conducted. That is what we are going to do.
3 Model
In the model that follows, expressive voting (voting to demonstrate support for a party
regardless of an election’s result) and instrumental voting (voting to try and affect the
outcome of the election) both depend on (1) the parties’ respective valences and (2) the
voter’s ideological distance from the parties.
However the ideological and valence motives for voting are related insofar as a voter’s
ideology drives his or her perception of valence. It is not just that ideological location
colors a voter’s view of how well a party is handling a particular issue (Sanders et al. 2011)
and how competent a party’s leader is (Jacoby 2009). Left and Right also rank the
importance of the issues differently. Thus, for instance, even if voters were unanimous that
one party is better at handling unemployment and the other at keeping inflation down, their
differing weighting of the issues themselves would ensure divergent valence scores across
the electorate (Palmer et al. 2013).
Sanders et al. (2011) find that spatial (i.e., ideological) variables have little effect on
voting until their indirect effect, operating through valence perception, is isolated and
added to the story. In what follows, we lump the direct effects and indirect effects together
and define them as ideological voting. Valence voting, therefore, means its ‘pure’ form,
i.e., voting stemming from perceptions of valence that are independent of a voter’s ide-
ology. For simplicity, we assume that this perception is common to all voters i.e., that
different estimates of valence stem entirely from ideological differences.
So let voter i derive the following expressive utilities from voting for L and R (the two
largest national parties) respectively:
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UEXPi;L ¼ avL  b hi  hLj j UEXPi;R ¼ avR  b hi  hRj j
where v is ‘pure’ valence as defined above, h is ideological location and b captures the
effects of ideology both directly and indirectly through imputed valence.
Now, over and above any expressive utility, let voter i’s welfare gain from having L’s
policies, not R’s, implemented be
UINSTi;L  UINSTi;R ¼ cðvL  vRÞ  dðjhi  hLj  jhi  hRjÞ:
Hence, i’s instrumental utility from voting for L is:
pðxÞUINSTi;L  UINSTi;R ¼ pðxÞ½cðvL  vRÞ  dðjhi  hLj  jhi  hRjÞ
where p(x) is the perceived probability that i’s vote will be decisive if i lives in con-
stituency x.
Hence, putting expressive and instrumental utilities together, and writing vL  vR in
future as v, i’s total excess utility from L rather than R is:
U0i ¼ av b hi  hLj j  hi  hRj jð Þ þ p xð Þ cv  d hi  hLj j  jhi  hRð Þ½ 
or, for a voter between hL and hR,
U0i ¼ aþ pcð Þv 2 bþ pdð Þhi þ bþ pdð Þ hL þ hRð Þ: ð1Þ
We now assume that voters will vote for a third party or abstain if jU0i j\yi, where yi is
uniformly distributed across the electorate from 0 to a maximum of y. (Thus a voter for
whom yi ¼ 0 will always vote for L or R, while a voter for whom yi is large enough will be
loyal to a third party or abstain in all circumstances.)
Voter i, then will
vote L if U0i [ yi,
vote 3rd party or abstain if yi\U0i\yi
vote R if U0i\ yi
We assume that voters in each constituency are normally distributed in terms of h
around the constituency mean (and median) lx. We calibrate the h-axis so that l ¼ 0 in the
seat where the L and R votes currently are equal.
Now let h yð Þ be the ideological position of voters for whom U0 = y. It follows that hðyÞ
and hðyÞ are the ideological points outside of which all voters support L or R, so that the
swing in constituency x caused by a small change in v will depend on the number of voters
in that constituency within the range ½hðyÞ; hðyÞ.
Now let v increase by dv. Then from (1):
The value of h needed for a voter to reach any given U0 rises by
aþ pc
2 bþ pdð Þ dv: ð2Þ
This is the size of the ideological interval within which voters previously below U0 will
attain it. Now consider voters for whom U0 = y. These voters are at h yð Þ; let their number
in seat x be nx h y½ ð Þ:
Thus, the number of voters in seat x whose U0 reaches y as a result of the increase in v is:
nx h y½ ð Þ: aþp xð Þc2 bþp xð Þdð Þ dv. Of these, given yi’s uniform distribution between 0 and y, the pro-
portion 1=y will start voting L in consequence.
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Thus L’s gain among voters who require U0 = y in order to vote for it is
1
y
 nx h y½ ð Þ  2 aþ p xð Þcð Þbþ p xð Þd dv
or, aggregating across all possible values of y, L’s gain in constituency x is
1
y
 nx½0; y  aþ p xð Þc
2 bþ p xð Þdð Þ dv
where n½0; y is the number of voters between h ¼ 0 and h ¼ y.
By symmetry R’s loss (of voters whose U0i now exceeds, their -yi) is
1
y
 nx y; 0½   aþ pðxÞc
2 bþ pðxÞdð Þ dv
Hence; swing ðsxÞ ¼ 1=2 L0s gainþ R0s lossð Þ ¼ 1
y
 nx y; y½   aþ pðxÞc
4 bþ pðxÞdð Þ dv ð3Þ
where the second term gives the number of ‘marginal’ voters in the constituency and the
third term measures the effectiveness of a valence change in shifting them.
Since the median voter in seat x is at ideological position lx, while the median voter in
the most marginal seat is at ideological position 0, it follows that that the greater is the
absolute magnitude of l the less marginal is the seat. We now consider the sign of ds
d lj j, i.e.,
whether swings will increase or decrease as seats become less marginal. Clearly the first
term in (3) is independent of lj j. We now show (1) that the second term is declining in lj j
and (2) the third term might be either declining or increasing in lj j:
1. Since n y; y½ jhN l; r2
   n y l; y l½ jhN 0; r2 ;
therefore;
d
dlx
nx y; y½ ð Þ ¼ n y lxð Þ  n y lxð Þj hx N 0; r2
  ð4Þ
which is negative (positive) when lx[ \ð Þ0: Thus the further the constituency is from the
knife-edge seat, whether to its left or to its right, the lower is this component of the swing.
This is just saying that marginal seats have more marginal voters.
2. d
dp
aþ pc
bþ pd
 
¼ c bþ pdð Þ  d aþ pcð Þ
bþ pdð Þ2 ¼
bc ad
bþ pdð Þ2 ð5Þ
Thus, aþpcbþpd is increasing in p and, hence (assuming
dp
d lj j\0) decreasing in lj j iff bc[ ad:
We now consider some implications. Throughout, we assume that aggregate voting has
both an instrumental and an expressive component.
Proposition 1 If bc[ ad, then the safer is the seat the smaller is the swing.
Here, both the second and third terms of (3) are decreasing in lj j.
The logic goes as follows. The component terms of bc[ ad are:
a = responsiveness of expressive voting to valence
c = responsiveness of instrumental voting to valence
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b = responsiveness of expressive voting to ideological distance between voter and party
d = responsiveness of instrumental voting to ideological distance between voter and
party.
But if bc[ ad, then b=d[ d=c. This means that, compared with their respective
sensitivities to valence, expressive voting is relatively sensitive to, and instrumental voting
relatively insensitive to, ideological differences between the voter and the party. But in a
safe seat, the expressive motive is relatively strong and the instrumental one relatively
weak. It follows that voting in these seats is ideology- rather than valence-driven, so that it
requires a large change in valence to get constituents to switch their votes. In this case,
then, a given change in valence will be less effective in safe seats than in marginal ones,
and this reinforces their existing tendency towards smaller swings, given by the fact that
they have fewer marginal voters in the first place.
Proposition 2 If bc\ad, then no monotonic relation may exist between marginality and
swing.
In this case, the second term of (3) is decreasing, but the third term increasing in lj j.
Why? This time the intuition is as follows. When ad[ bc (i.e., a=c[ b=d) it is
instrumental voting that is relatively sensitive to, and expressive voting relatively insen-
sitive to, ideological differences between the voter and the party. It is thus in the marginal
seats (where instrumental voting is most important) where the vote is driven most strongly
by ideology, and where it thus requires the largest change in valence to get voters to switch.
In this case a given change in valence is more effective in safe seats than in marginal ones,
and this effect counteracts the latter’s tendency towards smaller swings, given by the fact
that there are fewer voters on the margin in the first place. With these two effects now
working in opposite directions, a monotonic relation between existing majority and swing
may no longer exist.
All of the foregoing considerations cast a new light on the proposition that a government
falling out of favor may losemore support in safe seats (where voters feel free to express their
feelings of protest) than in marginal ones (where some voters would like to protest but do not
actually want the government to be ejected from office.) The implicit assumption behind this
story is some voters are expressively anti-government but instrumentally pro-government.
This could be the case—indeed it corresponds to the case where ad[ bc in our model (as the
government’s valence declines, expressive sentiments change faster than instrumental cal-
culations). But it doesn’t have to be the case—it is equally possible that the declining valence
hasmore impact on the instrumental motive than on the expressive one. In that case relatively
few voters will be deserting the government as a protest, and many more doing so as a
strategy. As the marginal seats are the ones where strategy is most preferred to protest, the
government will do worst in the seats where it can least afford to lose ground.
But so far we have been assuming that national swings are caused by changes in the
valences of the parties. What if voters are switching because one of the parties has shifted
its ideological position?
Proposition 3 If one or both parties shift their ideological position, then the safer the
seat the smaller the swing.
Suppose that hR rises by dh: Then from (1) the value of h needed for a voter to reach
any given U0 rises by dh=2. Hence, dh=2 replaces aþpc
2 bþpdð Þ dv in (2), so that (3) becomes
sx ¼ 1y  nx y; y½ dh=4: Since, as we have seen, nx y; y½  is declining in lj j we have a
monotonic inverse relation between existing majority and swing. Clearly, the same relation
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would also hold if both parties shifted ideology, or (which comes to the same thing) the
electorate itself underwent a wholesale ideological move one way or the other.
To summarise then: (1) If swings are driven by valence changes, and valence is more
dominant in instrumental voting than in expressive voting, the largest swings will be in the
most marginal seats. (2) If swings are driven by valence changes, and valence is more
dominant in expressive voting than in instrumental voting, then the ideological position of
the swing voter shifts furthest in safe seats, compensating for the fact that they have fewer
swing voters to start with, and possibly producing either an increasing or a hump-shaped
relation between existing majority and swing. [It cannot be U-shaped because at l ¼ 0,
swing is increasing in l on account of the second term in Eq. (3) being independent of it—
see Eq. (4)]. (3) If parties are gaining or losing ground because their own ideology, or that
of the electorate, has shifted, again the swing will be larger the more marginal the seat.
Therefore, should we find either an increasing or a hump-shaped relation between existing
majority and swing, the evidence is consistent with (2) only.
Before leaving the model, note that the parameters a; b; c and d together ensure that the
relation between p and swing can vary by several orders of magnitude. Inspection of Eq. (5)
will show that a large (small) difference between the products ad and bcwill mean that small
(large) differences in p between different constituencies can produce large (small) differences
in swing. This is important, given the finding in the British Election Study (2005) that the
marginality of the seat in which a voter lives makes only a very small difference in the
perceived probability that they can affect the result.1 As will be seen in the results section of
this article, the difference in average swing betweenmarginal and safe seats, though not great,
is greater than one might at first sight expect given the British Election Study’s results. This
points to a large difference in the respective magnitudes of ad and bc.
4 Method and data
To analyze the impact of a seat’s marginality on swing we make use of all constituency
results (Northern Ireland excepted) wherein either Labour or the Conservatives won
between 1950 and 2015. However, the elections of February 1974, 1983, 1997 and 2010,
all of which followed major boundary changes, are used only to calculate swings at the
succeeding election (and to establish which seats being contested by incumbent MPs). Our
basic regression model is run using OLS and is as follows:
Swingjt ¼ b1Mjt þ b2Xjt þ b3Dt
here j refers to the constituency and t to the general election. Swing is swing between
Labour and Conservative,2 with positive swing representing swing to the gainer (party
favored by the national swing). M is a matrix of variables measuring the marginality of the
seat, X is a matrix of conditioning variables, and D is a set of year dummies, i.e. fixed
effects for each election. Fixed effects for each constituency would not be appropriate
1 This is the nearest that existing surveys get to asking voters directly if they would have voted differently
had their constituency been more or less marginal. But see, e.g., Blais and Rheault (2011), who find that
moving from the least to the most marginal constituency in Canada raises the proportion of the most
‘politically attentive’ voters who think that their votes could be pivotal by 52 percentage points.
2 This includes swings between Conservative and Labour in seats where one of these parties won, but the
other was not the runner-up. We declined to exclude such seats; they are not the only ones in which swings
may have been distorted by tactical voting, and in any case a control variable in the form of ‘other parties’
vote’ is entered.
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because the majority of constituencies consistently were safe or marginal between each set
of boundary changes. Controlling for constituency characteristics would thus largely
control for just the variable we need to isolate for analysis.
For the purposes of this article we use traditional or ‘Butler’ swing. Traditional or
‘Butler’ swing looks at parties’ shares of the entire vote and averages one party’s gain and
another one’s loss. Two-party swing replaces shares of the poll by shares of the combined
vote of the two parties concerned. In some contexts, two-party swing captures the
dynamics of the political process better than traditional swing (For example, it does not
find a spurious ‘swing’ between the two main parties as a result of voters switching
between third parties and abstention). Nonetheless, we use the traditional version of swing
in this article. That is because much of our analysis is to do with the possible behavioral
effects of voters’ realization that they are, or are not, in a marginal constituency. Public
discussion of the swing needed to topple an MP or a government is couched entirely in the
language of traditional swing. ‘The Tories’ 96th most winnable seat’ is not the one where
the Conservative-Labour vote ratio is the 96th nearest to 50% but the one where Labour’s
percentage margin over the Conservatives, as a proportion of the entire vote, is the 96th
smallest. Commentators on election night do not present two-party swings, nor do they
appear to have them in mind when they say ‘that’s one Labour should have won if it’s
seriously hoping to form a government’. Consequently, we use Butler swing as the one
most likely to shape electors’ perceptions of the consequences of their vote.
A further important methodological point is how to model the kind of incumbency
effects, postulated and confirmed by Steed and Curtice, whereby a sitting incumbent might
specifically brake or accelerate the national electoral trend. What we do is create two
dummy variables, INCUMBENT and LAG.INCUMBENT. INCUMBENT is entered as 1
(-1) if an incumbent MP standing at the current election belongs to the party that is
gaining (losing) ground nationally. LAG.INCUMBENT is entered as 1 (-1) if an
incumbent MP standing at the previous election belonged to the party that is gaining
(losing) ground at the current election. Thus, if, for example, the same MP fought both
elections we would expect the coefficients on INCUMBENT and LAG.INCUMBENT to
sum to zero (no incumbency swing will be observed at this election because the MP already
will have been enjoying an incumbency advantage). If incumbents of opposing parties
respectively fought the two elections, we would expect a double incumbency effect, such
that the product of INCUMBENT and its coefficient, and that of LAG.INCUMBENT and
its coefficient, would have the same signs.3
5 Results
Column (1) of Table 1 regresses constituency swing to national gainer on percentage
majority, other parties’ (i.e., not Labour or Conservative) shares of the vote and incum-
bency score as just defined (p-values in brackets). The coefficient on majority is
insignificant, thus giving no reason to believe that marginal seats in general reflect the
3 Suppose, for instance, that a Labour MP had been defeated in 2001 and his or her Conservative successor
stood as the incumbent in 2005. As the national swing in 2005 was to the Conservatives, the seat would have
a LAG.INCUMBENT dummy of -1. A defeat of the previous Labour incumbent ought to magnify any
swing to the Conservatives in 2005, so we would expect the lagged dummy and its coefficient to have a
positive product, i.e., the coefficient is predicted to be negative. The INCUMBENT dummy is 1 (national
gainer is the same party is the current incumbent) and we would again expect this dummy and its coefficient
to have a positive product. Therefore, the coefficient on INCUMBENT should be positive.
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Table 1 Relation of swing to majority
Swing to gainer Swing to gainer Swing to gainer
(1) (2) (3)
Majority -0.0012 0.0678*** –
(0.660) (0.000)
Majority squared – -0.0013*** –
(0.000)
Conservative majority 0.1833***
(0.000)
Cons. maj. squared – – -0.0049***
(0.000)
Labour majority 0.0472***
(0.000)
Lab. maj. squared – – -0.0007
0(0.000)
Labour seat – – 0.5829***
(0.001)
Other parties -0.011* 0.0064*** -0.0199***
(0.074) (0.001) (0.003)
Incumbent 0.8018*** 0.8190*** 0.8362***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lag incumbent -0.8269*** -0.8434*** -0.8216***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1951 1.134 0.601 0.112
1955 1.555 1.014 0.551
1959 1.046 0.519 0.091
1964 3.909 3.415 2.942
1966 3.056 2.555 1.959
1970 4.741 4.277 3.668
1974 (Oct) 2.190 1.755 1.141
1979 4.833 4.388 3.767
1987 2.872 2.429 1.857
1992 3.430 2.949 2.467
2001 2.124 1.746 1.093
2005 3.762 3.303 2.736
2015 1.402 1.012 0.503
Adjusted R2 0.495 0.503 0.520
No. of obs. 6231 6231 6231
Constituency results between 1950 and 1997 are from Caramani, D., Elections in western Europe since
1815: electoral results by constituencies (London: Macmillan, 2000). Constituency results for 2001 and
2005 are taken from Norris P., The British Parliamentary Constituency Database, 1992–2005 (Release 1.3)
Constituency results for 2010 and 2015 are taken from the British Election Studies for those elections (http://
www.britishelectionstudy.com) The incumbency status of candidates is compiled from Whitaker’s
Almanack
* significant at 10% level, *** significant at 1% level
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national trend at an election any more or less strongly than safe ones. It is possible, though,
that we are imposing a linear trend on a non-linear relationship. Consequently, column (2)
tries out a quadratic version, with swing to gainer regressed on both percentage majority
and its square. Both coefficients are now significant at the 1% level; their respective
positive and negative signs give us a humped curve. The downturn of the hump, however,
comes quite late: it takes a majority of 25.6% before the swing starts to turn down again.
The implication, then, is that the safer the seat, the more strongly it follows the national
trend, except for a slight reversal of the picture when seats are very safe.
Before trying to interpret this result, we make a distinction between Labour and Con-
servative-held seats. According to column (2), both the linear and the quadratic relation-
ship between majority and swing are stronger when the seat is Conservative, but the ratio
of the linear to the quadratic coefficient is smaller, implying that Conservative seats reach
their ‘hump’ at a much smaller majority than do Labour ones. Figure 1 illustrates.
But the fact, so strikingly shown here, that swings are more variable in Conservative-
held seats than in Labour ones does not mean that Conservative seats simply have larger
swings. The two lines compare swings in a party’s seats with the swing in that party’s most
marginal seat. But, as the coefficient on LABOUR SEAT in column 3 of Table 1 shows,
the most marginal Labour seats exhibit larger swings, on average, than the most marginal
Conservative ones. When we allow for that, by plotting all swings in relation to that in the
most marginal Conservative seat, the picture is rather different. Conservative-held seats
continue to have more variable swings, but not necessarily larger ones. More research is
needed on the causes of this (Fig. 2).
We said earlier that the difference in swings between marginal and safe seats, though
fairly modest even in the Conservative case, is still large in relation to the differences in
voters’ estimates of p. This, we saw, indicates that ad and bc are of unequal strength. We
can now go further. Our results indicate that ad exceeds bc. If, furthermore, we accept the
finding of some recent scholars that the valence motive for voting greatly outweighs the
‘spatial’, i.e., ideological one, then a is the strongest of the parameters, i.e., voting that is
expressive and valence-driven dominates the other three varieties.
Another thing to notice from these results is the virtual equivalence of the coefficients
on INCUMBENT and LAG.INCUMBENT. A party, it seems, can feel indifferent between
losing a hostile incumbent and gaining a friendly one. And note, finally, that parties’
campaigning efforts—with the well-established consequence that they are better at holding
their own marginals than winning those of the other side—cannot explain why swings
become larger as seats become safer. A party putting its best efforts into its marginals will
indeed suffer a less hostile swing there when it is losing ground, but will also enjoy a larger
swing there when it is gaining. And in any case, it is becoming a marginal, not being a
marginal, that apparently leads to more strenuous campaigning than before and might
therefore alter the swing. However, when we regressed swings on the first differences of
MAJ and MAJ2, we found no significant relation.
6 Some extensions
We now consider some factors that might affect voters’ perceptions of their ability to affect
the result. So far as these change p(x), they will alter the relative weights of expressive and
instrumental voting and, hence, the relation between existing majority and swing. In the
first place, voting may become more expressive and less instrumental when little doubt
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exists about who is going to win nationally. Swinging the result in a marginal seat may
seem less important to the voter when the marginal seat has no apparent chance of
swinging the national outcome. The difference in swing between marginal and safe seats
would then be less pronounced. Thus, we create the interactive variables MAJ  NATLEAD
and MAJ2  NATLEAD, where NATLEAD is the national percentage lead (over the runner-
up) of the election winner. Should the coefficient on MAJ  NATLEAD be significant and
opposite in sign to that on MAJ, that would be consistent with our conjecture—that the
more decisive the national result, the less distinctive the voters’ behavior in marginal seats.
Column (1) of Table 2 shows some evidence for the conjecture. MAJ * NATLEAD and
MAJ2 * NATLEAD are both statistically significant and opposite in sign to MAJ and MAJ2.
It seems that marginal seats do behave more like safe ones when only the constituency
result is at stake. The above does assume, however, that voters’ expectations are best
Fig. 1 Difference in swing between Labour and Conservative-held seats
Fig. 2 Swings in Conservative seats are more sensitive to existing constituency majority
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proxied by the actual result. An alternative measure would be the average of opinion poll
forecasts on Election Day. The variable POLLLEAD is the average percentage lead, on
polling day and across all polls, of the party forecast to win. As column (2) shows, some
support for the conjecture still is found, but the coefficients and significance levels of both
interactive variables are down. It would seem that voters’ behavior is to an extent driven by
their expectation of the national result, and that they are better at predicting this than the
Table 2 Are marginals less different when the national result isn’t marginal? Sources: Constituency results
and incumbency scores as in Table 1. Opinion poll figures from Butler and Butler (2000, 2006) and www.
bbc.co.uk/news, accessed May 2015
Swing to gainer Swing to gainer Swing to gainer
MAJ 0.1092*** 0.0887*** 0.1451***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MAJ2 -0.0025*** -0.0020*** -0.0032
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)***
MAJ * NATLEAD -0.0082*** – –
(0.009)
MAJ2 * NATLEAD 0.0002*** – –
(0.000)
MAJ * POLLLEAD – -0.0037* –
(0.076)
MAJ2 * POLLLEAD – 0.0001*** –
(0.001)
Other parties -0.0201*** -0.0196*** -0.0349***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
Incumbent 0.8091*** 0.7991*** 0.4506***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.010)
Lag incumbent -0.8311*** -0.8204*** -0.3719***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.007)
1951 0.591 0.605 0.307
1955 0.978 1.024 –
1959 0.532 0.522 –
1964 3.289 3.405 –
1966 2.613 2.555 2.334
1970 4.244 4.278 –
1974 (Oct) 1.691 1.764 1.545
1979 4.434 4.376 –
1987 2.711 2.444 –
1992 3.019 2.939 –
2001 1.77 1.607 –
2005 3.203 3.284 –
2015 1.067 0.918 –
Adj R2 0.503 0.503 0.429
No. of obs. 6231 6231 1611
* significant at 10% level, *** significant at 1% level
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pollsters—which will surprise no one after the latter’s performance at the 2015 general
election and 2016 EU referendum.
Because NATLEAD is more significant, we use it in the construction of Fig. 3. The
lower position of the curve as NATLEAD increases shows how constituency swings
become more uniform as the national result becomes more decisive, as conjectured above.
The bunching of the curves asMAJ increases indicates the converse: that the national result
matters less as seats become safer. Again, we might expect this: as the seat gets safer,
voters will care less about the national picture as their hopes of influencing it fade.
The other notable thing about Fig. 3 is that at NATLEAD =15, the shape of the curve
reverses and it becomes a U. Given that the largest lead in our series of elections was
11.4% (Conservative over Labour) in 1987—leads were larger (though still below 15%) in
1983 and 1997 but these elections followed constituency boundary changes and were thus
used by us only to derive swings at the following elections—the curve is hypothetical and
should be treated with caution. All the same, Eq. (3) yields at any rate a partial rationale for
its shape.
Swing ðsxÞ ¼ 1=2ðL0s gainþ R0s lossÞ ¼ 1
y
 nx y; y½   aþ pðxÞc
4 bþ pðxÞdð Þ dv ð3Þ
In (3), the only factor preventing a monotonically downward sloping curve was the
change in the third term brought about by changes in MAJ by way of changes in p. But, as
argued already, p likely is less sensitive to MAJ when NATLEAD is large. Hence, a
downward-sloping curve is more likely when the national result is very lop-sided. Why the
curve for NATLEAD = 15 should turn up again when MAJ is very large remains a puzzle,
but we are dealing here with both a small number of very safe seats and a notional overall
result way beyond anything actually experienced since 1950.
Another possibility is that voters’ awareness that the seat is marginal and, hence, the
way some of them vote, depends on how long ago the last election was. As we have already
Fig. 3 Marginal seats look more like look more like safe ones when the national result is decisive
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seen, Curtice and Steed have found that turnout in marginals is greater than in non-
marginals and that turnout in marginals is greater still in elections that come quickly after
their predecessors (1951, 1966, October 1974). But is there a parallel effect on the way the
inhabitants of marginals vote, as opposed to the likelihood that they vote at all? When we
run swing to gainer on majority and majority squared for the elections of 1951, 1966 and
October 1974 only, the coefficients on both variables go up (column 3). Three elections
comprise a rather meagre data set, but our finding, so far as it goes, implies that voters in
marginal seats do behave more distinctively when a recent election reminds them that the
seat is marginal.4
A fundamental objection to the proposition that ‘marginals should be different’ is that it
is not the existing marginals that are going to swing the election, but rather those seats that
would be marginal in the event of a close national result (the ‘bellwether’ seats). The
foregoing argument assumes that voters will regard as crucial those seats currently having
small majorities. What if they realize that the seats crucial to the outcome are the bell-
wether seats? If Labour needs to gain 100 seats to win the election, then, even with the
certainty of non-uniform swing, the 100th most marginal Conservative seat is far more
likely to be decisive than the most marginal one. Might it therefore be in the bellwether
seats that we see the most distinctive voting behaviour?
To test this possibility, we re-run column 2 of Table 1, except that our main inde-
pendent variable no longer is the existing majority in each seat, but the absolute difference
between its percentage government majority (positive or negative) and the percentage
government majority in the government’s nth most marginal seat, where 2n is its parlia-
mentary majority over the main opposition party—i.e., the bellwether seat.
In column 1, the coefficients on BELL and BELL2 (0.0757 and -0.0016) are little
different from what they were on MAJ and MAJ2 (0.0709 and -0.0013). But when a horse
race is run between the two measures in column 2, bellwether wins decisively. Not only do
the coefficients on MAJ and MAJ2 shrink by an order of magnitude, they also lose most of
their statistical significance (Table 3). If voters are better at predicting elections than are
opinion polls and have the ability to distinguish between marginal and a bellwether seat,
this article is giving them rather a good post-election report.
7 In the Liberals
Finally, we compare Conservative-Labour marginals with the second most common form
of marginals, those contested between Conservatives and Liberals, where Liberal means
Liberal up to 1979, Liberal or SDP in 1983, the Liberal-SDP Alliance in 1987 and Liberal
Democrat from 1992 onwards. (Over the period as a whole too few Labour-Liberal mar-
ginals exist for analysis to be possible, though they became much more common in and
after 2005.) We can skip all the extensions of the last section: we can’t analyze nationally
close versus decisive Conservative-Liberal results because there weren’t any close ones,
nor were there enough close Conservative-Liberal contests in the three elections with a
recent predecessor for us to ask if these elections were distinctive. And clearly the idea of
4 The other notable feature here is that the coefficients on ‘incumbent’ and ‘lag incumbent’ have roughly
been halved. The weakened results here could reflect new incumbents not having enough time to make
themselves well known in the constituency. And the shorter the time is between the two elections, the more
likely it is that a defeated MP will stay on and try to win the seat back, and the less likely it is that he or she
will have been forgotten in the meantime, in which case the aura of incumbency might be shared between
the old and the new member.
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bellwether seats makes no sense if no one thought the Liberals were liable to win any of the
elections.
What we therefore do is take those seats where Conservative and Liberal were in first
and second place, in whatever order, and ask if there is a relation between size of majority
and swing to national gainer (as between Conservative and Liberal). As can be seen from
columns (2) and (4) of Table 4, looking for quadratic functions produces no significant
results. But when we look for a linear relation between majority and swing, we find a
negative one, provided that we distinguish between Liberal- and Conservative-held seats
(col. 3). When we regress swing simply on absolute majority, the significance disappears
and the coefficient changes sign (column 1).
So how can marginal seats exhibit the largest swings in Liberal seats and in Conser-
vative seats, but not in seats taken as a whole? The clue lies in the large positive coefficient
on ‘Liberal seat’ in column 3. Liberal-held seats, on average, feature larger swings. But
over the period as a whole, Liberals have held relatively, as well as absolutely, fewer
Table 3 Do marginals or Bell-
wethers matter? Sources: as in
Table 1
** significant at 5% level, ***
significant at 1% level
Swing to gainer Swing to gainer
BELL 0.072*** 0.049***
(0.000) (0.000)
BELL2 -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
MAJ 0.029**
(0.014)
MAJ2 0.0001
(0.770)
Other parties -0.022*** -0.022***
(0.001) (0.000)
Incumbent 0.780*** 0.860***
(0.000) (0.000)
Lag incumbent -0.833*** -0.789***
(0.000) (0.000)
1951 0.638 0.558
1955 1.069 0.979
1959 0.582 0.493
1964 3.501 3.427
1966 2.602 2.516
1970 4.256 4.164
1974 (Oct) 1.796 1.721
1979 4.402 4.322
1987 2.549 2.595
1992 3.107 3.061
2001 1.685 1.495
2005 3.421 3.305
2015 1.044 0.982
Adjusted R2 0.506 0.508
No. of obs. 6231 6231
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marginal seats, i.e., the preponderance of Conservative over Liberal seats has been even
greater in marginal seats than in safe ones. Consequently, when everything is lumped
together, safe seats have larger swings because safe seats are more likely to be Liberal and
Liberal seats have larger swings. Disaggregate, and the inverse correlation between
majority and swing within each party’s seats shows up. We saw in the theoretical section
Table 4 Conservative-liberal majorities and swings. Sources: as in Table 1
Swing to gainer Swing to gainer Swing to gainer Swing to gainer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Majority 0.0157 -0.0322 – –
(0.284) (0.444)
Majority squared – -0.0009 – –
(0.421)
Conservative majority – – -0.6332*** -0.1367
(0.003) (0.787)
Cons. maj. squared – – – 0.0010
– (0.364)
Liberal majority – – -0.0923** -0.0907
(0.014) (0.268)
Lib. maj. squared – – -0.0005
(0.818)
Liberal seat – – 1.755*** 0.4010
(0.006) (0.629)
Other parties -0.0095 -0.0015 -0.1933*** -0.0036
(0.707) (0.954) (0.000) (0.891)
Incumbent 0.9817*** 0.9317*** 0.8521*** 0.9407***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lag incumbent -0.980*** -0.961*** -0.8656*** -0.9583***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1951 -0.3922 -0.813 6.268 -0.896
1955 -7.477 -7.084 1.131 -7.176
1959 4.856 4.795 12.816 4.727
1964 9.852 9.698 18.101 9.596
1966 -0.444 0.048 7.097 -0.117
1970 4.075 4.343 10.656 4.220
1974 (Oct) -0.359 -0.215 6.672 -0.330
1979 5.539 5.762 12.221 5.619
1987 -0.204 -0.066 7.476 -0.220
1992 -0.100 -0.009 7.678 -0.162
2001 0.274 0.547 8.383 0.492
2005 -0.205 0.076 7.790 0.004
2015 10.351 10.615 18.065 10.4623
Adjusted R2 0.467 0.482 0.506 0.471
No. of obs. 965 965 965 965
** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level
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that an inverse relation between majority and swing is consistent with a good many
different assumptions about voter behavior—the simplest being the likelihood that floating
seats have more floating voters.
8 Conclusions
We highlight a number of reasons why voters in safe and marginal seats may behave
differently. In particular, differences may emerge if voters’ decisions are made up of a
combination of expressive and instrumental motives, and the instrumental motive is
stronger in marginal seats because voters in such constituencies expect to have a better
chance of determining the result. We then analyze general election results between 1950
and 2015 in Britain to look for a relationship between a constituency’s majority and its
likely swing between Labour and Conservative at the next election. We find that the
strongest swings in the direction of the national swing are to be found in seats that are
neither too safe nor too marginal. Our model would suggest that this might be because very
safe seats have fewer floating voters, while marginal seats are dominated by instrumental
voting, which might be less responsive to changes in parties’ valences than its expressive
counterpart. However, seats where the main contest was between Conservative and Liberal
Democrat (or formerly Liberal) showed a more straightforward inverse relation between
majority and swing.
Investigating the possibility that it is the distance of a seat from the ‘bellwether’ seat
(the one that would be most marginal if the election as a whole were on a knife-edge) did
not produce significantly different results from those obtained using majority. However,
putting both bellwether and majority into our regression sustains the relationship between
swing and the former but not the latter, though the high collinearity between the two means
that this final result must be treated with caution.
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